This paper examines the incentives of programmers to contribute to open source software projects on a voluntary basis. In particular, the paper looks at how this incentive changes as (i) performance becomes more visible to the relevant audience,
Introduction
Open source software (OSS) is a computer program whose source code -the instructions for the program, written in a human readable format -is distributed free of charge and can be modi…ed, extended, adapted, and incorporated into other programs with relatively few restrictions. OSS is a rapidly expanding phenomenon: some OSS such as the Apache web server, dominate their product categories. In the personal computer market, some OSS such as the operating system Linux and the web browser Firefox gain rapid popularity. It is The …rst explanation is that programmers simply like to be involved in open source projects, either because they enjoy being creative, or due to a sense of obligation or community related reasons, or simply due to sheer altruism.
2 Indeed, a web-based survey conducted by Lakhani and Wolf (2003) reveals that the responding programmers were mainly driven by enjoyment-based intrinsic motivations.
The second explanation involves another type of intrinsic motivation. According to this explanation, individual users such as system managers (e.g., users of Apache), who make all sorts of software improvements for their own bene…t, are willing to share these improvements with other users in their community. A model along these lines is o¤ered by Johnson (2002) , who views participation in OSS projects as a private provision of a public good (see Bessen, 2006, and Schröder, 2007 , for related models).
The third explanation, suggested by Lerner and Tirole (2002) , is that programmers are willing to contribute to OSS projects in order to signal their ability to potential employers, venture capitalists, or to peers and thereby boost their human capital or enhance their social status within the programmers'community. Fershtman and Gandal (2004) examine a large data set on programmers' participation in OSS projects and argue that their …ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that participants in OSS projects are indeed driven by such extrinsic motivations. Hann et al (2004) examine a panel data on contributions to three Apache OSS projects for the period 1998 to 2002. They …nd that while an increase in the number of contributions to the Apache OSS projects does not result in wage increases for contributors, credentials earned through the merit-based ranking system within the Apache open source community are associated with a 13% 27% increase in wages, depending on the rank attained. These …ndings suggest that status within the Apache Software Foundation serves as a credible signal of the contributor's productivity.
Drawing on the "career concerns" literature (e.g., Holmström, 1999) , Lerner and Tirole (2002) conjecture that the signalling incentive to participate in OSS projects will become stronger as (i) performance becomes more visible to the relevant audience, (ii) e¤ort has a stronger impact on performance, and (iii) performance becomes more informative about talent. While these conjectures are intuitively appealing, it is possible to think about the opposite conjectures. For instance, if e¤ort has a greater impact on performance and/or if performance becomes more visible, then even a small amount of e¤ort may enable talented programmers to produce a visible positive signal about their talent. 3 Likewise, if performance is more informative about talent, then it might be that even limited amount of performance may be enough to demonstrate high ability.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the Lerner and Tirole conjectures in the context of a formal model. In this model, programmers are privately informed about their types:
some are "talented"and have high productivity, while others are "untalented"and have low productivity. To signal their types to prospective employers, programmers participate in OSS projects and their participation is either "successful" (i.e., the programmer "solves a problem") or it "fails" (i.e., the programmer "fails to come up with satisfactory results").
The main question that I ask is how is the e¤ort that agents exert when participating in OSS projects a¤ected by (i) the probability that successful participation will be observed by prospective employers, (ii) an increase in the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of success, and by (iii) a decrease in the probability that an untalented programmer will succeed.
I show that the model always admits a no-e¤ort equilibrium in which …rms do not expect programmers to exert e¤ort in OSS projects, and programmers indeed do not exert such e¤ort. However, the model may also admit interior equilibria in which programmers contribute to OSS projects and observed success in such projects translates into higher wages. When these equilibria exist, then generically their number is even, with half being stable and half being unstable. The analysis shows that the three conjectures may or may not be correct depending on.whether we start from a stable or an unstable interior equilibrium and depending on the shape of the marginal productivity of the e¤ort of talented agants.
These results suggest that in general it is hard to say which factors will boost the signalling incentive of talented agents and which factors will weaken it.
There are two closely related papers that also argue that programmers participate in OSS projects in order signal their abilities to prospective employers. These papers di¤er from mine both in terms of their set up and in terms of their main focus. Lee, Moisa, and Weiss (2003) consider a model in which programmers need to choose between joining closed source software …rms and OSS projects. If they join software …rms, their wage re ‡ects the expected productivity of all programmers who join closed-source software …rms (more and less talented ones). On the other hand, if they join OSS projects, they forgo current wages, but can signal their productivity to software …rms and thereby boost their future wages. focus on the e¤ect of the externality on the incentive of talented agents to contribute to the OSS project. They show that if the OSS is a substitute (complement) for the commercial software then the contribution of talented programmers will be lower (higher) than in the case where OSS and the commercial software are independent of each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 shows that the model can give rise to multiple equilibria and characterizes them. Section 4 illustrates the equilibria in the model and Section 5 studies the comparative static properties of the model and examines how the incentive to contribute to OSS projects is a¤ected by the visibility of the contribution to prospective employers, by the sensitivity of performance to e¤ort, and by how informative is the performance about talent. Section 6 examines the e¤ect of intrinsic motivation to contribute to OSS projects. Concluding remarks are in Section 7.
The model
Consider a competitive job market with a large number of agents, each of whom is either "talented" (i.e., has a high productivity) or "untalented" (i.e., has a low productivity). If hired by a …rm, the marginal productivity of a talented agent is w, while the marginal productivity of an untalented agent is normalized to 0. Under full information, the wage of each agent is equal to his marginal product. Hence, the wage of talented agents is w while the wage of untalented agents is 0.
Under asymmetric information, it is common knowledge that the fraction of talented agents in the population is , but …rms cannot tell the agents' types before hiring them (agents however know their own types). Before the labor market opens up, agents participate in an OSS project in the hope of convincing prospective employers that they are talented.
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I assume that each agent either succeeds (i.e., "solves a problem") or fails (i.e., "fails to come up with satisfactory results"). The probability that an untalented agent succeeds is exogenous and equal to p 0 . Talented agents by contrast can boost their probability of success by exerting e¤ort: if a talented agent exerts e¤ort e in the OSS project, his probability of success increases from p 0 p(0) to p(e).
In and of itself, the OSS project does not bene…t the …rms nor the agents directly (for now I ignore intrinsic motivations to participate in OSS projects). The only advantage of participation is that it generates a signal on the agents'types. Firms cannot directly observe if and how much e¤ort agents exert; rather they can only (imperfectly) observe successful actions. 5 In particular, …rms observe a successful action with probability . With probability 1 , as well as when the activity fails, …rms observe nothing. Hence, is a measure of the visibility of the agents' performance to potential employers. Whenever …rms observe nothing, they cannot discern whether the agent has exerted e¤ort but failed or whether he did not exert any e¤ort.
Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives, I make the following assumptions on the probability that a talented agent will succeed:
Assumption A1 says that e¤ort raises the probability of success but does so at a decreasing rate. Assumption A2 says that if talented agents do not exert e¤ort, then their probability of success is equal to the success probbaility of untalented agents. Moreover, it says that the success probability of talented agents goes to 1 as their e¤ort goes to in…nity; this assumption will ensure the existence of a solution to the maximization problem of agents.
The payo¤ of each agent is increasing with his expected wage, Ew, and decreasing with his e¤ort level, e: U = Ew e:
Equilibrium
I now look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which talented agents exert e¤ort, untalented agents do not exert e¤ort, and the beliefs of …rms are consistent with the agents'strategies.
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To characterize this equilibrium, suppose that …rms believe that the e¤ort of talented agents is b e. Recalling that the fraction of talented agents is , it follows that conditional on observing a successful action, …rms believe that the agent is talented with probability
On the other hand, if …rms do not observe a success, then they cannot tell whether (i) the agent is talented, exerted e¤ort, and either failed or his success was unobserved, (ii) the agent is untalented and either failed or his success was not observed. The probability of events (i) is (1 p(b e)), while the probability of event (ii) is (1 ) (1 p 0 ) : Hence, conditional on not observing a successful action, …rms believe that the agent is talented with probability
Note that given Assumption A2, q(0 j s) = q(0 j n) = : if …rms expect talented agents to exert no e¤ort, then success or failure is not an informative signal about the agent's talent.
Moreover, note that q(b e j s) approaches 1 as p 0 approaches 0: if untalented agents cannot 6 Untalented agents do not exert e¤ort because their success probability is independent of their e¤ort and equal to p 0 : succeed then success is a sure sign that the agent is talented. The next step is to …nd the e¤ort level that talented agents will exert. To this end, note that since the labor market is competitive, the wage of agents is q(b e j s)w following an observed success and q(b e j n)w otherwise. Hence, the expected payo¤ of talented agents given their e¤ort level, e, and given the belief of …rms, b e, is
The …rst term on the right-hand side of (3) re ‡ects the idea that with probability p(e), a talented agent succeeds and his success is observed by …rms. The second term re ‡ects the idea that with probability 1 p(e), a talented agent either succeeds but his success is not observed by …rms or the agent simply fails. In both cases, …rms cannot tell whether the agent is talented or not and hence they pay him q(b e j n)w. The last term on the right-hand side of (3) is the agent's cost of e¤ort.
Assuming that there is a large number of talented agents, each will ignore the e¤ect of his own e¤ort level on b e. Since Assumption A1 ensures that U (e; b e) is strictly concave in e, the e¤ort level that each talented agent will choose given the …rms'beliefs, b e, is de…ned implicitly by the following …rst order condition:
where
is the increase in the probability that …rms assign to an agent being talented following an observed success. The expression p 0 (e) (b e)w represents the marginal bene…t from e¤ort which is equal to the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability that a successful action will be observed, p 0 (e), times the extra expected wage that an agents gets in this event, (b e)w.
At an interior optimum, this marginal bene…t must be equal to the marginal cost of e¤ort, which is 1. But, if p 0 (e) (b e)w < 1 for all positive e¤ort levels, then talented agents will not exert any e¤ort. Assumption A2 ensures that @U (e;b e) @e must be negative for large values of e because the fact that lim e!1 p(e) = 1 implies that lim e!1 p 0 (e) = 0. Before proceeding, I
establish two important properties of (b e) in the next lemma:
Lemma 1: (b e) is an increasing function with (0) = 0.
Proof: Straightforward di¤erentiation reveals that
Since Assumption A2 ensures that q(0 j s) = q(0 j n) = , we get (0) = 0.
Recalling that (b e)w is the extra expected wage that an agent receives following an observed success, Lemma 1 implies that when …rms believe that talented agents exert more e¤ort, then they are willing to pay higher wages to agents who were observed to be successful as these agents are more likely to be talented. Moreover, if …rms believe that talented agents do not exert e¤ort, then observed success is not informative about talent.
Next, let BR(b e) denote the solution of (4). This function is the best-response of each talented agent against the …rms' beliefs about his e¤ort level. In equilibrium, the …rms' beliefs must be consistent with the true e¤orts of talented agents. Hence, the equilibrium e¤ort level, e , is de…ned implicitly by the equation
In other words, the equilibrium is de…ned by the intersection of the best response function, 
A3
The marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of success is large for e = 0:
If Assumption A3 fails, then it never pays talented agents to exert e¤ort, no matter how high b e is, so BR(b e) = 0 for all b e.
Lemma 2: Suppose that Assumption A3 holds. Then, the best response of talented agents against the …rms'beliefs about their e¤ort levels, BR(b e), has the following properties:
(i) BR(b e) = 0 for all 0 < b e b e 1 (talented agents do not exert e¤ort if …rms do not expect them to exert much e¤ort) and BR(b e) > 0 for all b e > b e 1 (talented agents exert e¤ort if …rms expect them to exert a large enough e¤ort), where b e 1 is implicitly de…ned by
and lim b e!1 BR 0 (b e) = 0:
Proof: See the Appendix.
Using Lemma 2, I can now characterize the equilibrium e¤ort level of talented agents.
To this end, recall that the equilibrium e¤ort level, e , is attained at the intersection of the best response function, BR(b e), with the 45 0 line in the (b e; e) space (the 45 0 line re ‡ects the requirement that in equilibrium, …rms must hold correct beliefs about the e¤orts of talented agents). Since BR(b e) passes through the origin, e = 0 is an equilibrium e¤ort level. Hence, there always exists a no-e¤ort equilibrium in which talented agents are not expected to exert e¤ort and indeed they do not exert e¤ort. 8 It is also possible that BR(b e) is just tangent to the 45 0 line. Such tangency point is also an equilibrium, but this equilibrium in non generic in the sense that it will vanish if we introduce small perturbations that may shift BR(b e) either upward or downward. In the rest of the paper I will therefore focus exclusively on generic equilibria.
Since p 00 (e) < 0, it follows that BR 00 (b e) < 0 if and only if
Notice that when BR 0 (e ) < 1, the best response function of talented agents, evaluated at the equilibrium point, is ‡atter than the 45 0 line and hence must cut it from above.
The resulting equilibria (e 2 and e 4 in Figure 1b ) are then stable in the sense that a Cournot tatônnement process will lead to convergence to the equilibrium point starting from any close neighborhood of the equilibrium point. On the other hand, whenever BR 0 (e ) > 1, BR(e )
is steeper than the 45 0 line and hence must cut it from below. Consequently, the resulting equilibria (e 1 and e 3 in Figure 1b ) are unstable. I summarize this discussion in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1: The model always admits a no-e¤ort equilibrium in which e = b e = 0.
A su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for the no-e¤ort equilibrium to be unique is that
However, if the model admits interior equilibria with e > 0, then generically, their number is even, with half being stable and half being unstable. A necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for the model to admit only two interior equilibria is
Next, suppose that interior equilibria exist. Recalling that in equilibrium b e = e , it follows from equation (4) that the equilibrium e¤ort level, e , is implicitly de…ned by
It should be noted that the left-hand side of (10) di¤ers from the left-hand side of (4) because in (4), the beliefs of …rms about the e¤orts of talented agents are arbitrary, while in (10) they are consistent with the true e¤orts of talented agents.
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In Section 5 below, I will study the comparative statics properties of e . Since the slope of G(e ) plays a key role in that analysis, I now establish the relationship between the slope of G(e ) and equilibrium stability.
Proposition 2: Suppose that the model admits interior equilibria with e > 0. Then, a 9 Put di¤erently, (4) characterizes the best response of talented agents against any beliefs, while (10) characterizes the intersection of the best response of talented agents with the 45 0 line.
given interior equilibrium is stable if G 0 (e ) < 0 and unstable if G 0 (e ) 0.
Proof: Note from (10) that G 0 (e ) = p 00 (e ) (e ) + p 0 (e ) 0 (e ) = [1 BR 0 (e )] p 00 (e ) (e );
where the second equality follows from (9). Since p 00 (e ) (e ) < 0, it follows that G 0 (e ) 0 if BR 0 (e ) > 1 (i.e., the equilibrium is unstable) and G 0 (e ) < 0 if BR 0 (e ) < 1 (the equilibrium is stable).
An example
To illustrate the results in the previous section, I will now assume that p(e) = 1 
Substituting for p(e) in equation (4) and rearranging terms, the best-response function of talented agents for large enough values of b e, is given by
where For small values of b e, the right-hand side of (12) is negative so BR (b e) = 0: Setting = = 0:5 and t = 0:01, I now show BR (b e) in Figure 2 for two values of w.
When w = 20, there exist two interior equilibria -a stable equilibrium in which e = 2:065 and an unstable equilibrium in which e = 0:008: When w = 6, BR (b e) lies everywhere below the 45 0 line and interior equilibria fail to exist.
Using this example, I can now examine how changes in and w a¤ect e . Figure   3a shows the given that = 0:5, t = 0:01, and w = 20; there are no interiorequilibria if < 0:0055 or > 0:833. Otherwise, there exist two interior equilibria for every value of : a stable equilibrium with a high e and an unstable equilibrium with a low e . Focusing on the stable equilibria, the …gure shows that e …rst increases and then decreases with .
Hence, an increase in the likelihood that a randomly recruited agent is talented may lead to either more or less e¤ort even when attention is restricted to stable equilibria. Figure 3b shows that holding = = 0:5, and t = 0:01, interior equilibria exist only when w > 7:124. In this range, there exists for every value of w one stable equilibrium with a high e and one unstable equilibrium with a low e . In stable equilibria, e increases with w, implying that talented agents exert more e¤ort in stable equilibria when their marginal productivity increases.
Comparative statics
Having characterized the equilibrium in my model, I can now examine the conjectures of Lerner and Tirole (2002) that the signalling incentive of agents is stronger when:
(i) performance becomes more visible to the relevant audience,
(ii) e¤ort has a stronger impact on performance, and (iii) performance becomes more informative about talent.
The e¤ect of the visibility of performance
To examine conjecture (i), recall that is a measure of the visibility of the agents' performance to …rms. Hence, I examine conjecture (i) by looking at how e is a¤ected by an increase in :
Proposition 3: An increase in which measures the visibility of the agents' performance to …rms, induces talented agents to exert more e¤ort in stable interior equilibria and exert less e¤ort in unstable interior equilibria.
Proof: Di¤erentiating equation (10) with respect to e and and rearranging terms, yields
Hence, the sign of @e @ is equal to the sign of G 0 (e ), which by Proposition 2 is positive in stable interior equilibria and negative in unstable interior equilibria.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 4 . The equilibrium e¤ort level, e , is attained when G(e)w, which is the marginal bene…t of e¤ort in equilibrium (i.e., when …rms hold correct beliefs about the agent's e¤ort) is equal to 1 which is the marginal cost of e¤ort. An increase in shifts G(e)w upward. Whether this leads to a higher or a lower e depends on whether G(e) is upward sloping (the equilibrium is unstable) or downward sloping (the equilibrium is stable). When G(e) is upward sloping, e increases with while when G(e) is downward sloping, e decreases with .
Proposition 3 shows that Lerner and Tirole's (2002) conjecture that the signalling incentive of agents will become stronger as their performance becomes more visible to the relevant audience is true only if the model admits interior equilibria and only if these interior equilibria are stable.
So far, I have assumed that the visibility of successful performence is p(e) if the agent is talented and p 0 if the agent is untalented. This assumption implies that the e¤ort that talented agent exert in boosting their probability of success and the visibility of success are complements in the production of signals about success. While this assumption is reasonable, one can also imagine case in which e¤ort and visibility of successful performence are substitutes rather than complements. For example, if e¤ort contributes not only to success but is also required in order to attract attention to the agent's performence, then an exogenous increase in visibility may allow agents to attract the same amount of attention with less e¤ort.
To illustrate this point, suppose that the probability of observing a successful action is p(e; ) = 1 (4) and rearranging terms, the bestresponse function of talented agents for large enough values of b e, is given by
where 
Hence, an increase in shifts BR (b e) downward, implying that the e¤ort of talented agents decreases in stable interior equilibria but increases in unstable interior equilibria. This result, which is the opposite of Proposition 3, suggsets that conjecture (i) depends not only on the stability of equilibrium, but also on whether e¤ort and visibility are complements in the production of positive signals (as implicitly assumed in Proposition 3) or substitutes (as in the current example).
The e¤ect of the sensitivity of performance to e¤ort
Next, I examine conjecture (ii) which states that the signalling incentive of agents will become stronger as e¤ort has a stronger impact on performance. To this end, I will introduce a new shift parameter, , which increases the probability of talented agents to succeed at each e¤ort level. That is, I will assume that the probability that a talented agent will succeed in an OSS project is given by p(e; ), where @p(e; ) @ > 0. To keep the notation simple, I will continue to denote the derivative of p(e; ) with respect to e by p 0 (e; ). I can now examine conjecture (ii) by studying the e¤ect of an increase in on e :
be the elasticity of p 0 (e ; ) with respect to and
be the elasticity of (e ) with respect to . Then, an increase in which implies that e¤ort has a stronger e¤ect on performance induces talented agents to exert more e¤ort in interior equilibria if either (i)
+ 1 > 0 and the equilibrium is stable, or (ii)
+ 1 < 0 and the equilibrium is unstable. Otherwise, an increase in induces talented agents to exert less e¤ort in interior equilibria.
Proof: Di¤erentiating equation (10) with respect to e and and rearranging terms,
where " p 0 and " are de…ned in the proposition. The proof follows by noting that
and recalling that G 0 (e ) is positive in stable interior equilibria and negative in unstable interior equilibria.
Proposition 4 is more involved than Proposition 3 because an increase in can shifts G(e) either upward or downward in Figure 4 , depending on the sign of
(which is the case when
is either positive or not too negative), then G(e) shifts upward when increases. As Figure 4 shows, this upward shift in G(e) leads to a higher e if G(e) is downward sloping (i.e., the equilibrium is stable) but to a lower e if G(e) is upward sloping (i.e., the equilibrium is unstable). Otherwise, if
hence, e increases if G(e) is upward sloping (i.e., the equilibrium is unstable) and decreases if G(e) is downward sloping (i.e., the equilibrium is stable).
The implication of Proposition 4 is that an increase in can either lead to more e¤ort by talented agents, as Lerner and Tirole's (2002) conjecture, or to less e¤ort, contrary to their conjecture. An increase in leads to more e¤eort either when we start from a stable equilibrium and p 0 (e ; ), which is the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of success, increases with , or when we start from an unstable equilibrium and p 0 (e ; ) decreases with . Otherwise, the Lerner and Tirole conjecture does not hold and an increase in induces talented agents to exert less rather than more e¤ort.
To illustrate Proposition 4, I will now modify the example from Section 4 by assuming that p(e; ) = 1 1 2 t+ e , where > 0. It is easy to verify that this function satis…es Assumptions A1-A2, is increasing with , and p 0 (e; ) = ln (2) 1 2 t+ e is …rst increasing and then decreasing with . Assumption A3 which ensures that BR(b e) > 0 for su¢ ciently large values of b e can be written in this case as follows:
In what follows, I will assume that w satis…es (11).
Substituting for p(e; ) and p 0 (e; ) in equation (4) and rearranging terms, the bestresponse function of talented agents for large enough values of b e, is given by BR (b e) = ln ( ln (2) (b e) w) t ln (2) ln (2) ;
where To examine the e¤ect of on e , let = = 0:5, t = 0:01, and w = 20: Figure 5a shows that when increases from 0:5 to 1, BR (b e) shift upward and the e¤ort of talented agents in the stable interior equilibrium increases from 1:856 to 2:066. However, when increases from 0:5 to 2, BR (b e) rotates clockwise, and the e¤ort of talented agents in the stable equilibrium decreases from 1:856 to 1:563. Consequently, the relationship between and e is non-monotonic.
To examine this nonmonotonicity further, Figure 6 shows e as a function of for = = 0:5, t = 0:01, and w = 20: When is small, there do not exist interior equilibria.
When > 0:356, there exist for each value of two interior equilibria: a stable equilibrium with a high e and an unstable equilibrium with a low e . Focusing on stable equilibria (the upper contour in Figure 6 ), one can see that e increases as increases from 0:356 to 0:754. However, once > 0:754, further increases in lead to a decrease in e . Hence, as Proposition 4 shows, the e¤ect of on e can be positive or negative even when attention is restricted to stable equilibria.
The e¤ect of the informativeness of performance about talent
Conjecture (iii) of Lerner and Tirole states that the signalling incentive of agents will become stronger as performance becomes more informative about talent. This conjecture can be examined by studying the e¤ect of p 0 on the equilibrium e¤ort level of talented agents, e , because a decrease in p 0 implies that successful agents are more likely to be talented. That is, when p 0 decreases towards 0, the probability that a successful agent is talented, , q(b e j s), increases towards 1.
Proposition 5 : A decrease in p 0 , which implies that performance is more informative about talent, induces talented agents to exert more e¤ort in stable interior equilibria and exert less e¤ort in unstable interior equilibria.
Proof: Di¤erentiating equation (10) with respect to e and p 0 , recalling that (b e) q(b e j s) q(b e j n) and rearranging terms,
where the square bracketed expression is negative because (1) is equal to the sign of G 0 (e ), which by Proposition 2 is negative in stable interior equilibria and positive in unstable interior equilibria. Consequently, a decrease in p 0 raises e in stable interior equilibria and lowers e in unstable interior equilibria.
Like Propositions 3, a decrease in p 0 shifts G(e) upward. When G(e) is decreasing (increasing) with e, which is the case in stable (unstable) interior equilibria, this shifts induces more (less) e¤ort. As in the case of Proposition 3 then, the conjecture is true only in stable interior equilibria but not in unstable equilibria.
Intrinsic motivation for participation in OSS projects
Up to now I have only considered extrinsic motivations for participation in OSS projects:
talented agents take part in OSS projects in the hope of generating positive signals about their talent and thereby boosting their prospects in the labor market. However, this view is obviously too narrow given that many programmers contribute to OSS projects for other reasons, like their sense of creativity, or their desire to solve problems that they face in performing daily tasks (e.g., system managers who …x bugs or add new functions to an existing software), or acquiring programming skills. The question is how such intrinsic motivations a¤ect matters.
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To address this question, suppose that apart from their ability to boost their prospects 10 Bitzer, Schrettl, and Schröder (2006) study a dynamic model that involves both intrinsic and extrinsic motives (i.e., signaling) for participation in open source projects and explore the interaction between them.
in the labor market, agents also draw a positive utility v from successful contributions to OSS projects (this utility is independent on whether the success is or is not observed by …rms).
11 Given v, the utility of talented agents becomes U (e; b e) = p(e) [v + q(b e j s)w] + (1 p(e)) q(b e j n)w e:
The e¤ort level that each talented agent will choose given the …rms'beliefs, b e, is now de…ned implicitly by the following …rst order condition:
It is easy to see from (13) that v raises the marginal bene…t from e¤ort and hence, other things being equal, it expands the set of parameters for which the model admits interior equilibria. Moreover, v shifts the best response function of talented agents upward in the sense that holding the belief of …rms, b e, constant, an increase in v leads to an increase in BR(b e): Consequently, it is clear from the analysis in the previous sections that an increase in v will lead to more e¤ort in stable interior equilibria but less e¤ort in unstable equilibria.
Conclusion
The main …nding in this paper is that the extrinsic motivation of programmers to contribute to OSS projects is more complex than it would seem at …rst glance. The reason for this is that the e¤orts of programmers are strategic complements in the sense that in equilibrium, the e¤orts of other programmers a¤ect the expectations of …rms about the programmers'talent and therefore a¤ect the marginal bene…t of participation in OSS projects. This complementarity has several important implications. First, there may not exist interior equilibria in which programmers exert e¤ort in OSS projects. This implies in turn that OSS projects may never take o¤. Second, when interior equilibria exist, we generically have an even number of interior equilibria. Assuming that an OSS project grows larger when programmers exert more e¤ort, this means that in general, an OSS project may be small or large depending on the prevailing equilibrium. Finally, the comparative static properties of interior equilibria are more complex than might be thought at a …rst glace. In particular, shifts in exogenous parameters, like an increase in the visibility of performence and an increase in the marginal productivity of e¤ort may either boost the signalling incentive of talented agents or weaken it even when attention is restricted to stable interior equilibria.
Of course, there are still a number of open quetions interesting extensions that must be addressed before we have a good understanding of the incentives to engage in licensing of interim R&D knowledge and their implication....
Mark Rysman: Suppose that participation in OSS boosts the human capital of agents by giving them experience. How can one discrimminate the hypothesis that agents join in order to obtain human capital from the competing hypothesis that they join to signal their existing ability and cannot boost it by participation? Perhaps a way to address this is by assuming that without participation you get a wage w but with participation you get a wage w 0 > w. This higher wage is attained irrespective of whether participation is observed.
Dynamic consideration: Heski: Suppose that we have programmer heterogeneity and 2 periods. With a high prob., talented programmers succeed in period 1. If increases, they exit the system in period 1 (a successful agent will stay if his success is not observed) so the average quality of the pool of participants declines in period 2. The incentive to stay in period 2 is therefore lowered and hence the incentive to exert e¤ort will be a¤ected. What will happen then? In particular, could it be that we get unravelling? If you stay in period 2 its not worthwhile to exert e¤ort and then this lowers the overall bene…t from joining and may lower the incentive to join in period 1.
"GE"con
Appendix
Following is the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof: (i) Since p 00 (e) < 0, it is easy to see from equation (4) 
Since Lemma 1 implies that (0) = 0, condition (14) The second equality in equation (15) and Lemma 1, reveals that BR 0 (b e), de…ned in equation (9), is positive.
